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REGULATION OF VARIABLE ANNUITY SALES:
THE AFTERMATH OF SEC v. VALIC
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in SEC v. Variable Annu-
ity Life Ins. Co., (VALIC) has climaxed a crucial legal controversy
over regulation of variable annuity sales. The decision reversed lower
courts' holdings 2 that variable annuity contracts sold by VALIC are
exempt from federal securities regulation. VALIC had insisted its
contracts are "insurance."'3 The immediate effect of the holding
is that VALIC is now subject to SEC regulation under the Securities
Act of 19334 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.' This note
will discuss and evaluate the decision, its rationale, and significance
to the states and the insurance industry with respect to future
regulatory problems which may arise concerning sale of variable
annuities by VALIC and by ordinary life insurance companies.
The variable annuity combines traditional insurance (annuity)
concepts with mutual fund principles" to solve two increasingly im-
portant problems in retirement planning-the problems of rising life
expectancy and declining purchasing power of the dollar.7 The
variable annuitant's capital is invested largely in common stocks, and
the issuing company undertakes to pay lifetime periodic benefits which
will vary with the investment experience of the company in managing
the common stock portfolio." Basically, the variable annuity rests
on the theory that cost of living fluctuates in close proportion to the
long-range rise and fall of the stock market.9 Thus, with his interest
tied to rising values of diversified stocks, the variable annuitant is
1. 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959).
2. 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.C.D.C. 1957), aff'd 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
3. Brief for Appellee VALIC, p. 12, SEC v. VALIC, 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
4. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1952).
5. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1952).
6. Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb.
1957, p. 75.
7. Average length of life in the United States has increased from 61.7 years in
1935 to 69.6 years in 1956. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 60
(79th ed. 1958). Purchasing power of the dollar, as measured by average monthly
consumer prices, has declined from a scale figure of 170.4 in 1935 to 83.2 in 1957
(using 1947-49 as a base period average of 100). Id. at 331. In other words, a
retirement dollar saved from 1935 until 1957 decreased to less than half of its
1935 consumer buying power.
8. 155 F. Supp. 521, 523-24 (D.C.D.C. 1957).
9. Mehr & Osler, Modern Life Insurance 85 (rev. ed. 1956); Johnson, The
Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1956 Ins. L.J. 357, 361.
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protected against inflation;1 if deflation occurs he is not injured,
because his "real" purchasing power will remain constant.
The proponents of the variable annuity assert that wide public
demand exists for these contracts.1 Three "insurance companies"-of
which VALIC is one-have been organized for the primary purpose
of selling them and are doing so in a few states. 12 The Prudential
Insurance Company, as one of several regular-line life insurers
desiring to issue variable annuities, definitely plans to sell them as
soon as enabling legislation is passed in its home state of New Jersey. 3
However, sale of the contracts by insurance companies has been
sedulously opposed by the securities industry because of the com-
petitive threat to mutual fund sales. 1 A part of the insurance industry,
notably the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,15 is also opposed
because of the fear that low returns on variable annuities during
market declines would destroy public confidence in the traditionally
stable insurance industry. 6
The controversy over regulation arose out of insistence by the
SEC and securities industry that the variable annuity is a "security."' 7
10. See Morrissey, supra note 6, at pp. 77-78.
11. See The Pru Leads Fight to Sell a New Kind of Annuity, Business Week,
June 28, 1958, pp. 110, 112, 114.
12. The companies are VALIC and Equity Annuity Life Ins. Co. (EALIC)
(chartered in the District of Columbia), and Participating Annuity Life Ins. Co.
(PALIC) (chartered in Arkansas). The sale of variable annuities is permitted
in Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, North Dakota and West Virginia.
Id. at pp. 111-12.
Members of Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n (TIAA) have been able to pur-
chase variable annuity contracts since 1952, through College Retirement Equities
Fund (CREF), a subsidiary of TIAA. However, members must "balance" their
payments between conventional and variable annuity plans. No more than fifty
per cent of each premium may be applied toward the variable annuity plan. See
Johnson, The Variable Annuity, 7 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 67 (1952).
13. See "Met" vs. "Pru"-The Variable Annuity Touches Off a Financial Free-
For-All, Barron's Jan. 23, 1956, p. 3; Business Week, supra note 11, at pp. 111,
114. See also text supported by notes 93-96 infra.
14. Morrissey, supra note 6, at p. 80.
15. See Business Week, supra note 11, at p. 114.
16. Ibid. The insurance spokesmen who oppose the variable annuity also ques-
tion its economic soundness as a retirement planning instrument. They assert
that past experience has not shown a true correlation between the cost-of-living
index and common stock prices and that there is no assurance of any such correla-
tion in the future. See id. at pp. 114, 118; Long, The Variable Annuity: A com-
mon Stock Investment Scheme, 1956 Ins. L.J. 393; Pyle, The Case Against Variable
Annuities, 1956 Ins. L.J. 776. See also, Morrissey, supra note 6, at p. 78.
17. "Security" is defined in the Securities Act of 1933 as "any note, stock . . .
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement .. . invest-
ment contract . . .or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security'. . . ." 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1952).
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The SEC sought to enjoin VALIC's sales activities until that company
complied with the Securities Act of 1933, which requires full dis-
closure of investment risks before securities are sold,18 and the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, which gives the SEC regulatory authority
over investment company organization and activities." VALIC claimed
it was exempt from those acts under sections excluding annuities and
insurance companies. The Securities Act exempts from its provisions
any "insurance" or "annuity" contract "issued by a corporation sub-
ject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner ...of any
State....1-2o The Investment Company Act exempts any company
"organized as an insurance company, whose primary and predominant
business activity is the writing of insurance .... ,,21 VALIC also relied
upon the McCarran-Ferguson Act which generally proscribes federal
regulation of the "business of insurance."22 The lower courts were
unable to classify VALIC's contracts either as insurance or securi-
ties,23 but denied the injunction implying that once state insurance
commissioners have subjected business to their regulation, it is the
business of "insurance" for regulatory purposes. 24
In reversing, the Supreme Court first reasoned that under the
federal acts involved, the meaning of "insurance" is a federal ques-
tion;25 hence, state rulings are not decisive.21 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Douglas, then analyzed the variable annuity and
recognized that it does utilize some traditional insurance and annuity
principles, e.g., principal and income are liquidated actuarially over
a lifetime or other period, and the company assumes the risk of mis-
This broad definition has been liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court in
effectuating Congress' intent to protect the investing public. See SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (land lease contracts); SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (land sales contracts).
18. The Securities Act makes it unlawful to use interstate commerce facilities
in the sale of securities until its requirements are met. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15
U.S.C. §§ 77e-(a) (1)-(2) (1952). For details on the act see notes 46-48 infra,
and text supported thereby.
19. It is likewise unlawful for unregistered investment companies to use inter-
state commerce facilities in the sale of securities. 54 Stat. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-7(a) (1) (1952). For details on the act see notes 49-52, 63-68 infra, and
text supported thereby.
20. 48 Stat. 76 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c-(a) (8) (1952).
21. 54 Stat. 793, 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(17), -3(c) (3) (1952).
22. The act states, "no Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance . . . ." 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1952).
23. See Note, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1115, 1119-20 (1958).
24. 155 F. Supp. at 527; 257 F.2d at 205.
25. 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 619-21 (1959).
26. Id. at 621.
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calculating mortality predictions in computing benefit payments.2 7
These were the features primarily relied upon by VALIC in claiming
to be within the insurance exemptions of the statutes in question.
21
However, the Court concluded that these insurance aspects are super-
ficial; the variable annuity cannot be called insurance in the tradi-
tional meaning employed by Congress, because it "places all the
investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company." 2 Since
VALIC does not guarantee any benefits payable in fixed amounts, and
thus assumes no true risk in the insurance sense,30 there can be no
claim of exemption from the provisions of the 1933 and 1940 acts.3 1
A comparison of basic conventional and variable annuity principles
will aid in evaluating the significance of the Court's decision. The
conventional "insurance-type" annuity protects against the risk of
outliving one's capital by guaranteeing fixed periodic payments for
life.:," This is accomplished by investing the annuitant's capital in
fixed-yield debt securities, such as bonds and mortgages, 33 and actu-
arially liquidating principal and income over the remaining life of the
annuitant in fixed amounts. In other words, the risk of outliving
capital is shifted to the issuing company which distributes such risk
among the whole annuity group with giaranteed payments calculated
on the basis of mortality tables2 ' The variable annuity resembles the
conventional annuity in that it shifts the risk of outliving capital to
the company.' .  The company spreads the risk actuarially among the
group on the basis of mortality tables, and guarantees each member
a beneficial interest for his lifetime. However, the actual benefit pay-
ments will vary, because the variable annuitant's interest is tied
directly and continuously to the over-all current value of the securities
in which the company has invested his money.30 All or most of the
money (after the company deducts its expense and profit37) will
27. Id. at 621-22.
28. Id. at 620.
29. Id. at 621.
30. Id. at 622.
31. See id. 621-23.
32. There is disagreement as to whether annuity payments must be fixed. See
Bellinger, Hagmann & Martin, The Meaning and Usage of the Word "Annuity,"
9 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 261 (1955); Day & Melnikoff, The Variable Annuity as a
Life Insurance Company Product, 10 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 45 (1955).
33. See Crobaugh, Annuities and Their Uses 134 (2d ed. 1933).
34. See Harwood & Francis, Life Insurance from the Buyer's Point of View
104-05 (1941).
35. 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 621 (1959).
36. See Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-
Feb. 1957, p. 75.
37. More than fifty-five per cent of the annuitant's capital is deducted for
loading charges in the first policy year. An average of fourteen per cent is de-
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be invested in equity securities subject to fluctuating market value and
yield.38 Appreciation of the total assets through capital gains and
reinvested dividends will increase the variable annuitant's interest
and thus protect him against inflation. However, either a sharp
market decline or poor company management of the equities port-
folio, or both, would cause the variable annuitant's actual cash pay-
ments to be small, or possibly nothing, i.e., he bears the entire risk
of adverse investment experience.3 9 This fact was held decisive in
the VALIC case.
In a concurring opinion,40 Justice Brennan minutely examined the
above principles and gave additional reasons which led him to join
ducted during the next four years and eleven per cent is deducted in years six
through ten. Thereafter eight per cent is deducted. See 155 F. Supp. 521, 530
(D.C.D.C. 1957).
In computing the benefit payments, VALIC deducts a charge of one and eight-
tenths per cent per annum on asset value. See 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 628 (1959) (con-
curring opinion).
38. See Morrissey, supra note 36.
39. To illustrate, assume that A, at age 40, is issued a variable annuity contract
under which he is to pay $50 per month until he attains age 65, at which time he
will begin receiving benefit payments monthly until he dies. During the pay-in
period, each of A's payments purchases a number of "accumulation units," the
monthly value of which will fluctuate according to the company's investment ex-
perience, i.e., realized and unrealized capital gains and/or losses and reinvested
dividends. Thus, A's $50 might purchase 10 accumulation units the first month,
9 the second, 11 the third, and so on.
At age 65, A might have accumulated a total of 2,690 such units. For the
purpose of computing his future benefit payments, the accumulation units are then
converted into "annuity units." This is accomplished by first converting the ac-
cumulation units into a total monetary sum based on their value at the time of
the conversion. This total, together with A's life expectancy based on mortality
tables, and an assumption that the company's net annual investment return will
be a certain rate (e.g., three and one-half per cent), determines the number of
annuity units, the value of which will be payable to A each month until he dies.
This number will remain constant, but annuity units, like accumulation units,
fluctuate in value according to investment experience. Each month A's number of
annuity units (e.g., 200) will be multiplied by the value of one annuity unit at
that time (e.g., $1.07) to compute his benefit payment. This illustrates a typical
"deferred straight-life variable annuity." The right to receive any further bene-
fits expires at death.
Variable annuity contracts offered by VALIC permit several variations in this
scheme, both in the manner of pay-in and pay-out. Thus, the purchaser may make
a lump-sum payment and begin receiving benefits at once, or he may defer them
until a later date. He may elect to receive fixed payments as in a conventional
annuity, or variable payments for a guaranteed period (e.g., life plus ten years),
or he may share the benefits with another under joint and survivorship provisions.
See specimen contract offered by VALIC, appendixed in 155 F. Supp. at 529-38.
40. 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 623-33 (1959). Justice Stewart joined the concurring
opinion. Justice Harlan filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Clark and Whittaker. Id. at 633-37.
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the majority opinion. His reasoning may be summarzied as follows:
Congress exempted the business of insurance from the 1933 and 1940
statutes because it was felt that the controls imposed by those acts
upon the sale of securities were not relevant to the form of "invest-
ment" known as insurance (including annuity contracts) .41 Insurance
in its common meaning involved little or no risk for the purchaser
other than the risk that the company might fail to meet its fixed
obligations; further, the states were then, and are today, providing a
highly paternalistic type of control over insurance companies in order
to assure solvency and the adequacy of reserves to meet company
obligations. 4 - In contrast, federal regulation of securities sales is not
inherently paternalistic; its main emphasis is upon free choice by
requiring full disclosure of all pertinent facts about offered securities
in order to enable investors to appraise the risks intelligently.43 The
need for such disclosure increases with the amount of risk inherent
in a transaction. The variable annuity, like a share in an open-end
investment company (mutual fund), places the entire risk of invest-
ment failure upon the purchaser .4 Hence, federal regulation of
variable annuity sales is within the clear intendment of the statutes
in question. Significantly, Justice Brennan emphasized that the provi-
sions of both the 1933 and 1940 acts are applicable to VALIC.45 The
Securities Act of 1933 relates entirely to pre-sale disclosure procedure
in interstate securities offerings.46 The act requires the security's
issuer to file with the SEC a registration statement containing com-
plete information about itself, its officers and the full nature of the
proposed enterprise.17 It further requires the issuer to distribute to
buyers an SEC-approved prospectus containing essentially the same
facts disclosed in the registration statement.- The Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 goes beyond mere pre-sale disclosure ;49 it contains,
41. Id. at 624.
42. Id. at 625.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 625-26. See note 39 supra and text supported thereby.
45. Id. at 625-26, 632.
46. The preamble to the act states it is "to provide full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof .... " 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
During the speculatory period of the 1920's many unsound securities were issued
and sold by "high pressure" methods to persons uninitiated in dealing with such
complicated merchandise. The need for correction of such practices led to the
passage of the 1933 act. See McCormick, Understanding the Securities Act and the
S.E.C. 19-21 (1948).
47. 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h (1952).
48. 48 Stat. 81 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1952). See McCormick, op. cit. supra
note 46, at 155-59.
49. 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 625-26 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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among others, provisions relating to the investment practices and
policy to be followed by companies to which it pertains. 0 These
provisions, in Justice Brennan's view, "are of the greatest regulatory
relevance.., where the investors.., participate on an 'equity' basis
in the investment experience of the enterprise."5' 1 Since the variable
annuitant participates on just such a basis, it is vitally important
that he know what type of investment policy the company will follow
in managing his interest in the portfolio.2 Effective checks to protect
investors and to prevent undisclosed changes in investment policy
can be provided only under the provisions of the 1940 act, because
traditional state insurance regulation "simply does not touch the
points of definition of investment policy and investment technique, and
control over investment policy changes . . . that the 1940 Federal
Act provides."'' 3
The Court's holding, in terms of immediate effects, places VALIC
and its companion companies under concurrent federal and state
regulation.54 These companies have been operating solely under the
insurance laws55 of the few states", in which they have been permitted
to sell. Neither the majority nor the concurring opinion contains
any suggestion that the states cannot continue to regulate as they
see fit the variable annuity's insurance features. The silence of the
decision on this point, plus its pointed recognition of the insurance
features (actuarial calculations,57 assumption of mortality risks,8
term insurance feature") seem to sanction continued state regulation.
However, whether to require VALIC-type companies to operate in
conformity to a state's insurance regulations or its Blue Sky Laws, or
50. "Salient . . . provisions . . . regulate the relationships betveen the com-
pany and its investment adviser, including fees and provisions for termination of
the contract; regulate trading practices, changes in investment policy, the issu-
ance of senior securities, proxies and voting trusts, the terms of redemption by
investors of their interests in the company; regulate, in the case of periodic invest-
ment plans . . . the 'sales load,' or amount of the investor's payment that does
not become part of his interest in the enterprise; and provide for detailed reports
to investors." Id. at 626.
51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 629.
53. Id. at 626.
54. There is no question of federal "preemption." Both the Securities Act and
the Investment Company Act specifically authorize concurrent regulation by
other governmental units, including the states. 48 Stat. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r (1952) (Securities Act); 54 Stat. 846 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1952) (In-
vestment Company Act). See 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 624 (1959) (concurring opinion).
55. See 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 619-21 (1959).
56. See note 12 supra.
57. See 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 621 (1959).
58. Ibid.
59. Id. at 623 n.15.
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both, is manifestly a question that each state must answer on a unilat-
eral basis. The likelihood that uniform results will be obtained seems
slight in view of the amount of previous controversy at the state
level. ' For example, many state securities administrators have indi-
cated their belief that the variable annuity is a security subject to reg-
ulation under Blue Sky Laws. The Supreme Court's holding could
lend controlling force to the arguments of those advocating Blue Sky
Law regulation, for if the holding is narrowly construed to mean that
the variable annuity is a "security" for all regulatory purposes, then
a state quite probably would exempt variable annuity companies from
its insurance laws and regulate them entirely under its Blue Sky Laws.
Such a result would be undersirable in view of the fact that regulation
of technical insurance principles and practices is foreign to the experi-
ence of state securities administrators. The insurance features of the
variable annuity might easily be left without any effective regulation
in such a state.
A related problem concerns potential conflicts which may result
from superimposition of SEC controls under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 upon state regulation of the variable annuity's insurance
features1 ' A considerable degree of overlap exists between the pro-
visions of the 1940 act and most state insurance codes. Both generally
contain comprehensive provisions to assure adequate company capital
structures, accurate financial statements and accounting, and fair sell-
ing practices."3 Within these overlapping areas, some initial conflicts
will undoubtedly arise. However, the 1940 act contains extensive pro-
visions not found in insurance codes, such as sections relating to trad-
ing practices,0' changes in investment policy,00 detailed reports to
investors,0 and "sales load" charges in the case of periodic investment
W10. See Note, The Classification and Regulation of Variable Annuities, 42
Mmi. L. Rev. 1115, 1130-38 (1958); Note, Variable Annuity: Security or An-
numty?, 43 Va. L. Rev. 699, 709-10 (1957).
(1. 1 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 7 4711 (1957). The new Uniform Securities Act
also defines the variable annuity as a security subject to its provisions. Uniform
Securities Act §§ 401 (1), 402(a) (5).
i;2. Proponents of the variable annuity have argued that concurrent regulation
would place "onerous burdens" on companies issuing variable annuities. See
Recker, Variable Annuity Contracts, Insurance or Securities?, 1958 Ins. LJ.
612, 614.
63. On the scope and content of regulatory provisions of the Investment Com-
any Act of 1940, see Loss, Securities Regulation 99-102 (1951). Regarding the
scwo e and methods of states' regulation of insurance companies, see Rehr & Osler,
Modern Life Insurance 688-93 (rev. ed. 1956); Patterson, Essentials of Insurance
Law 23-32 (2d ed, 1957).
64. 154 Stat. 808 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12 (1952).
05. 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1952).
60. 54 Stat, 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § BOa-29(d) (1952),
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plans6 7 comparable to the variable annuity.68 These are largely the
provisions which Justice Brennan felt must apply to VALIC.60 The act
also gives the SEC a dispensing power to exempt any person, security,
or transaction from the act's provisions if such exemption is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest/° The SEC may well use this
power to leave room for state insurance commissioners to regulate
the pure insurance features of the variable annuity within the gen-
eral scope of insurance codes. At the same time, however, the SEC
should clearly define its own sphere of regulative authority by pro-
rmulgation of preemptive rules applicable to all VALIC-type companies
operating on an interstate basis.
The major question which confronts the insurance industry in the
wake of SEC v. VALIC is to what extent the holding will affect regu-
lar-line life insurance companies, such as Prudential, when and if these
companies execute their announced plans7" to sell variable annuities.
These companies are as much opposed to being federally regulated as
was VALIC.7 2 Whether or not they will be able to resist successfully
the SEC's efforts to control them under the federal statutes in question
may depend largely upon how the VALIC decision is to be interpreted.
At the outset, it should be noted that there are at least two important
facts in the VALIC case which may be used as a basis for distinguish-
ing it. First, defendant VALIC was organized and operates as a com-
pany engaged primarily in the sale of variable annuity contracts; and
second, the contracts sold by VALIC are wholly variable, i.e., they
guarantee no minimum fixed benefit payments, because all of the pur-
chaser's consideration is or may be invested in equity securities.
Although these two facts are interrelated, it will be helpful to consider
them separately with regard to the question of whether their presence
or absence might have a controlling effect in future cases.
The VALIC decision does not specifically advert to the fact that
VALIC sells only variable contracts, but that fact is necessarily rele-
vant in view of the holding that VALIC must be regulated under the
Investment Company Act of 1940. VALIC sought to invoke the ex-
emptive provision of that act which excludes any company "organized
as an insurance company, whose primaiy and predominant business
67. 54 Stat. 829 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1952).
68. See note 50 supra and text supported thereby.
69. See quotation in text supported by note 53 supra.
70. 54 Stat. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1952).
71. See text supported by note 13 supra.
72. See Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed,
1956 Ins. L.J. 357, 369-72; The Pru Leads Fight to Sell a New Kind of Annuity,
Business Week, June 28, 1958, pp. 114, 122.
73. See 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 621 (1959).
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actiity is the writing of insurance . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The
Court's holding that VALIC's contracts are not "insurance" within the
federal meaning meant that VALIC could not claim the exemption.
However, a regular-line life insurance company selling a line of vari-
able annuities along with its traditional varieties of insurance con-
tracts would be in a much different position. So long as only a minor
portion (presumably less than half) of its total business consisted of
variable annuity sales, it would still be engaged primarily and pre-
dominantly in the writing of insurance and would fall squarely within
the 1940 act's exemption. This does not mean, of course, that all fed-
eral regulation would be precluded, for it would still be necessary to
comply with the Securities Act of 193375 by filing a registration state-
ment and issuing an SEC-approved prospectus 7 6 before offering the
variable annuities ("securities") for sale. But these are minor re-
quirements indeed when contrasted with the stringent restrictions
and prohibitions upon company activities imposed by the 1940 act.7
Although Justice Brennan felt that the 1940 act's controls are vitally
necessary to protect holders of variable annunities,7 it does not appear
that those controls could be imposed in the face of the plain language
of the exemptive clause.
A more intricate question is raised by the second distinguishing fact
in the VALIC case-the fact that VALIC's contracts are wholly vari-
able. The opinion of the Court placed major emphasis upon this fact
in concluding that VALIC's contracts are not "insurance":
In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that has no ele-
ment of a fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense.
... For in common understanding "insurance" involves a guar-
antee that at least some fraction of the benefits will be payable in
fixed amounts. (Emphasis added.) -
If an issuer invested some part of the purchaser's consideration in
fixed-yield debt securities and the remainder in equity securities, and
guaranteed that "some fraction of the benefits" (corresponding to the
portion invested in debt securities) would be payable in minimum fixed
74. 54 Stat. 793, 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(17), 80a-3(c) (3) (1952).
75. Insurance companies are not among issuers exempt from compliance with
the 1933 act, although "insurance contracts" are exempt. See 48 Stat. 76 (1933),
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1952). The act applies to any "issuer" which it defines
as "[a] person who issues or proposes to issue any security .... " 48 Stat. 74
(1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1952). (Emphasis added.) The section entitled,
"Exempted Transactions," 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1952) contains
no provision or reference relating to the issuance of securities by insurance
companies.
76. See notes 46-48 supra and text supported thereby.
77. See notes 63-69 supra and text supported thereby.
78. See notes 51-53 supra and text supported thereby.
79. 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 622 (1959).
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amounts, it appears that such issuer would qualify, within the Court's
language, for the insurance exemptions. Many proponents of the vari-
able annuity have in fact recommended some sort of "balance" in in-
vestments between debt and equity securities,8' although their pro-
posals differ as to how the balancing should be accomplished. The
method most heavily advocated is that of external balancing, by re-
quiring or encouraging the individual to apportion his retirement
savings between separate variable and fixed income annuities.1 Thus,
the Prudential Insurance Company's proposal is to require that no
variable annuity be issued unless the purchaser first states he has a
fixed income annuity or will simultaneously obtain one. 2 This might
well be the most practical system from the standpoints of both in-
dividual and company. However, it is extremely doubtful that such
a plan would exempt the issuer from SEC regulation, since the variable
annuity would be a separate contract with no "fraction of the benefits"
payable in fixed amounts. To fall within the Court's language, the
issuer would apparently have to stipulate in the contract that some
reasonable minimum portion of the variable contract's benefits would
be payable in fixed amounts. To do this, it would be necessary to
internally balance the annuity portfolio's assets between equity and
debt securities (possibly on a fifty-fifty basis). The issuer might then
guarantee that the payable benefits would be at least half what the
purchaser would receive under an ordinary fixed income annuity, and
thus establish the "floor" which the Court considered indispensable to
a claim of insurance exemption under the 1933 and 1940 acts.8 3
At least two serious disadvantages would be involved in any attempt
to tailor an internally balanced "fixed-variable" annuity to meet the
Court's language. First is the risk that the Court in a future case
might interpret its language quite differently than has been assumed.
It might hold that if any substantial portion of the annuitant's interest
were calculable only in variable terms (i.e., according to his pro rata
share in equity securities8 4), the contract would not qualify for the
insurance exemptions. The second disadvantage is economic, i.e., that
internally balanced annuities might have little if any sales appeal to
80. See Day & Melnikoff, The Variable Annuity As a Life Insurance Company
Product, 10 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 45, 51-53 (1955); Kvernland, Some Economic and
Investment Aspects of Variable Annuities, 1956 Ins. L.J. 373, 375-77; Note, 42
Minn. L. Rev. 1115, 1134-35 (1958).
81. See Kvernland, supra note 80. See also note 12 supra.
82. See Day & Melnikoff, supra note 80, at 53. Legislation proposed in New
Jersey (sponsored by Prudential), which would permit insurers there to sell
variable annuities, provides for balancing in this fashion. See Note, 42 Minn.
b. Rev. 1115, 1135 & n.121 (1958).
83. See 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 622-23 (1959).
84. Id. at 621-22.
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many persons interested in a variable plan. Convinced that long-range
inflation is built into the economy, 5 such persons might well prefer to
take advantage of the much higher peaks in value which an all-com-
mon-stock variable annuity would attain during periods of market
climb.80 Furthermore, balanced annuities would probably be unsalable
to the large group of persons who already have some type of fixed
dollar retirement program, such as a conventional annuity or a share
in a group pension plan87 If half of such a person's savings were al-
ready invested in a fixed plan, he would have to place the remainder
into a wholly variable annuity in order to attain a truly balanced life-
time program. 8 These disadvantages, among others, 9 may well cause
insurers to decide against the issuance of balanced annuities, in spite
of the Court's implied grant of exemption.
A further question to be considered is to what extent the decision in
SEC v. VALIC will affect future state action in permitting sale of
variable annuities by regular-line life insurance companies. Variable
annuities have not been sold to the public in most states, by either
VALIC-type or regular-line companies, because of statutory restric-
tions which sharply limit insurers' segregation of assets, common stock
purchases and related investment activities.90 The wide divergency of
opinion among the states on how sales should be regulated9' has ham-
pered efforts to pass enabling bills. 2 The movement for modifying
legislation has been strongest in New Jersey93 where bills have been
85. The proponents of the variable annuity place much stress on the contention
that inflation will continue. This argument is based on such factors as govern-
ment price supports and deficit spending, unemployment compensation, and strong
labor unions. See Address by Gordon W. McKinley, Public Hearing Before Mass.
Special Comm'n for Investigation and Study of Ins. Laws, April 30 and May 1,
1957.
86. See Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-
Feb. 1957, pp. 75, 80-82.
87. See Day & Melnikoff, supra note 80, at 52.
88. Id. at 51.
89. A further shortcoming of internally balanced annuities, from the issuer's
standpoint, is that a substantial portion of fixed-yield debt securities are not
readily capable of market valuation, e.g., mortgages. The securities comprising
the variable annuity portfolio must have easily determinable market values in
order to facilitate calculation of the annuitants' interests, both during pay-in and
pay-out periods. Day & Melnikoff, supra note 80, at 52.
90. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 376.300 (Vernon 1949); N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 79-81,
85, 87. Only a small minority of states place no restriction upon the percentage
of assets insurers may invest in common stocks. See Mehr & Osler, Modern Life
Insurance 691-92 (rev. ed. 1956); Comment, 1958 U. Ill. L. Forum 466, 470 & n.31.
91. See notes 60, 61 supra and text supported thereby.
92. See "Met" vs. "Pru"--The Variable Annuity Touches Off a Financial
Free-For-All, Barron's, Jan. 23, 1956, pp. 3, 4.
93. Ibid.
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introduced which would enable life insurers to sell variable annuities
under the broad regulatory authority of the insurance commissioner.,4
The bills also permit segregation of a special asset account to consist
of equity and other securities-5 (which would comprise the variable
annuity portfolio). Intensive promotion of these bills in New Jersey
and of similar ones in other states is expected in the future.,, How-
ever, the VALIC decision could substantially hinder passage of the
bills if the states, in their reluctance to see federal regulation extended
to a traditional area of state control, place an unwarranted interpre-
tation upon the decision. To avoid misconstruction, it should first be
recognized that the Court did not extend federal control to the insur-
ance field per se, nor did it foreclose state regulation of the variable
annuity's insurance features.97 Rather, it held that issuers selling
contracts which place all investment risks upon the purchaser thereby
invade the boundaries marked by Congress for the securities business,
and federal regulation is mandatory.9 8 Presumably the holding applies
to issuers of whatever type, but here again the distinction between
VALIC-type and regular-line life insurance companies is important.
VALIC primarily sells variable contracts and thus must be regulated
under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Company
Act of 1940. Regular-line companies are exempt under the 1940 act
so long as their "primary and predominant business" is insurance.',
Thus they would need only comply with the 1933 act to issue a line of
variable annuities, once statutory barriers at the state level are re-
moved.
This would produce no significant change in the present pattern of
state insurance regulation, for the states would continue to administer
whatever controls are considered necessary over company organiza-
tion, capital structure, investment activities, and standard contract
provisions. 1°0 In these areas the provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 have no applicability; that act merely requires issuers to make a
94. The Need for Variable Annuities, A Statement by Carrol M. Shanks,
President, The Prudential Insurance Company of America, pp. 2-3, 8-10 (Pru-
dential Press).
95. Ibid. See also Schecter, Variable Annuities-Boon or Bane?, 1956 Ins.
L.J. 764, 771.
96. SEC's Newest Job, Business Week, March 28, 1959, p. 132; Wall Street
Journal, March 24, 1959, p. 3, col. 3.
97. See text supported by notes 57-59 supra.
98. 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 621-23 (1959).
99. See text supported by note 41 supra. See also 54 Stat. 793, 798 (1940),
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a) (17), 80a-3(c) (3) (1952).
100. These are the major areas of state insurance regulation. See 79 Sup. Ct.
618, 625 & n.8 (1959) (concurring opinion). See also Mehr & Osler, Modern Life
Insurance 688-93 (rev. ed. 1956); Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 23-32
(2d ed. 1957).
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full disclosure about themselves and their contracts as part of the
marketing process.' Disclosure is accomplished by requiring the is-
suer to register with the SEC0 2 and to publish an SEC-approved pro-
spectus1'"3 containing full facts about the enterprise. Requiring regular-
line life insurers to comply with this disclosure procedure in selling
variable annuities would not conflict with or encroach upon the ad-
ministration of state insurance laws. Most states regulate marketing
practices of insurers chiefly through the licensing of insurance sales-
men ;14 licenses are revocable for miscreancies such as fraud, mis-
representation, rebating and twisting.10 5 Patently this sanction can
be brought to bear only after damage has been done. The Securities
Act of 1933, requiring full disclosure of risks before transactions are
consummated, would enhance rather than impair the effectiveness of
existing state controls.
A fact worthy of emphasis is that regular-line life insurers have
been among the most active proponents of state legislative amend-
ments to permit insurers' sales of variable annuities.106 As shown
above, concurrent regulation of such companies by the states and by
the SEC under the 1933 act poses no undue problems or hardships;
but if any hardships are involved they will fall directly upon the com-
panies and not upon the states or the public. If insurance companies
desire to sell variable annuities, federal regulation, at least to the
extent of the 1933 act's provisions, is now fait accompli. That act pro-
vides the necessary minimum disclosure protection to which prospec-
tive investors are entitled when they are invited to assume the entire
risk of adverse investment experience. Additional protective controls,
such as the ones encompassed by the Investment Company Act of
1940,'' 7 can readily be imposed by the states within the paternalistic
framework of state insurance regulation.
101. See note 46 supra and text supported thereby.
102. See note 47 supra and text supported thereby.
10.. See note 48 supra and text supported thereby.
104. See Mehr & Osler, op. cit. supra note 100, at 694-96; Johnson, The Variable
Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1956 Ins. L.J. 357, 372.
105. Mehr & Osler, op. cit. supra note 100, at 695-97.
106. See notes 13, 94, 95 supra and text supported thereby.
107. See notes 49-53 supra and text supported thereby.
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